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Abstract: This paper will articulate the conditions of thinking about the 
transition of Division II in Heidegger’s Being and Time in order to imagine the 
architecture of the missing Division III, which never appeared in the published 
Part I of Being and Time (1927). The paper explores questions of temporality, 
historical temporality, and Heidegger’s confrontation with Hegel at the end of 
Being and Time while enlisting the resources of his very late lecture of 1962 – 
“On Time and Being” – to lay down the conditions of possibility to reconstruct 
the missing Division III. The paper argues that this feat has yet to be adequately 
accomplished given 90 years that have elapsed since the publication of Being 
and Time. 
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Within Being and Time the leap from section 65 on ecstatic temporality to 
section 72 on motion to section 81 on within-time-ness and the ordinary 
conception of time to section 82 on the encounter with Hegel is quite daunting. 
To traverse this movement from an independent, speculative-metaphysical 
reconstructive impulse to imagine the missing Division III seems altogether 
impossible. But this is what we will set out to do. Our guiding clue will be the 
1962 lecture “On Time and Being,” which was delivered some 35 years after the 
publication of Being and Time.1 We are not trying to avoid the densely, 
                                                        
1 This is not the place to enter into the massive landscape of perspectives on the relationship 
between Being and Time and the 1962 lecture “On Time and Being.” For that discussion, see 
Hubert Dreyfus’ (2005) forward to Carol White’s Time and Death: Heidegger’s Analysis of 
Finitude, edited by Mark Ralkowksi. Ashgate: Hants, ix. For general discussions on death and 
time in Being and Time in relation to his whole corpus, see Critchley, Simon and Reiner 
Shurmann. 2008. On Heidegger’s Being and Time, edited by Steven Levine. Routledge: Oxford; 
Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall, eds. 2007. Blackwell Companion to Heidegger. Blackwell: 
Oxford; Blattner, William. 2006. Heidegger’s Being and Time: A Reader’s Guide. London: 
Continuum; Dreyfus, Hubert and Mark Wrathall, eds. 2002. Heidegger Rexamined, Vol. 1: 
Dasein, Authenticity and Death. London: Routledge Press; Blattner, William. 1999. Heidegger’s 
Temporal Idealism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Faulconer, James E. and Mark 
Wrathall. 2000. Appropriating Heidegger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Taylor, 
Carmen 2003. Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse and Authenticity in Being and 
Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Wrathall, Mark and Jeff Malpas, eds. 2000. 
Heidegger, Authenticity and Modernity: Essays in Honor of Hubert Dreyfus. Cambridge: MIT 
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complicated debates of what caused the demise of the project of fundamental 
ontology in Being and Time, the question of the Kehre, or the turning of/to the 
History of (the Sendings) of Being, the second attempt at Being and Time, namely 
the quixotic Beitrage (1936), and the final, ghostly attempt to rethink the main 
question throughout Heidegger’s philosophical life, namely the mysterious link 
between being and time, namely the 1962 lecture “On Time and Being.” 
Heidegger’s genius was to avoid an uncritical metaphysical conceptualization of 
time in terms of the history of concepts of being while giving new breath, 
mystery and vision to the question of time when it is not predicated on these two 
classic extremes: either the paradoxes of metaphysical logic, i.e the problems of 
motion and change, or theological-existential-psychological fears of human 
mortality. He was not pursuing a solid foundation to conceive of time as some 
‘thing’ present (essence, concept, intuition, or sign); nor was he a psychologist 
trying to discover a solution to the mystery of why human beings feel anxious 
about coming to an end, i.e. a mid-life crisis or terminal disease. Neither being in 
time (beings who come and go in time) nor time in being (kairos as the fulfilled 
or propitious time) and neither the being of time (substance as permanence) nor 
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California Press; Richardson, William. 1993. From Thought to Phenomenology, 2nd. Ed. New 
York: Fordham University Press; Barash, Jeffrey. 2003. Heidegger and the Problem of Historical 
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the time of being (epochality or the sign of the times) will be our focus in this 
paper.  
The transition from Division II to Division III (which has never appeared) 
is like the transition from a place to a place that does not exist. Hence a creative 
act has to suspend any kind of historiographic impulses based on ordinary 
conceptions of time: a) the missing Division III was contemporaneous with the 
material that was presented with the rest of Being and Time (Introduction, 
Divisions I and II) but never came to light; b) the missing Division III is hiding 
somewhere or has been destroyed; c) everything after Being and Time can be 
appropriated and utilized to either justify the collapse of fundamental ontology 
or glorify the turn to language, art, and technology thereafter, which then 
becomes a shadow of the missing Division III’s allegedly, true concerns or 
intentions; d) “On Time and Being” is a delayed version of the missing Division 
III and should serve as an ample substitute for it because it leaves open the true 
promise of the end of Being and Time: the passage to an-other beginning of 
Western philosophy will always run the risk of resuming the contents in the 
history of Western philosophy, which Being and Time attempted to destroy, and 
so such a passage should never be attempted but left in suspense to respect the 
true achievement of Being and Time. The possibility of metaphysics is itself a 
perpetual mystery and never a progenitor for an eternal concept-solution to the 
main question, which is the meaning of Being in general.2 Because Being and 
Time does not answer its last question – “Does time itself manifest itself as the 
horizon of Being?” – does not mean it should not be answered or cannot be 
answered. For it would be quite shocking that a normative response of what 
should or should not be takes the place of a singular ontological answer to a 
fundamental question, namely the meaning of Being. The italicized time…Being in 
the last question foreshadows both the title of the missing Division III and “On 
Time and Being” of 1962. 
So we begin with some precautionary measures as to not be weighed 
down with initial presuppositions that go unquestioned. “On Time and Being” is 
not a substitute for the missing Division III, and whether it gives us a proper 
orientation to appreciate the achievements and limits of Being and Time, let 
alone its ‘failure,’ is not the issue. Rather, if one were to attempt a reconstruction 
of the missing Division III without ever having seen any fragments or notes of it, 
then in fact a reconstruction of something that does not exist would have to be 
an original construction in its own right. If what is missing does come to light 
after such an independent construction is attempted, and if both texts – real and 
imaginary – are deemed similar in content, then this would not detract from the 
                                                        
2 This is how we view the legacy of postmodernism, or Derridean deconstruction specifically, 
which pronounces an end to the idea of an ‘end of metaphysics,’ any notion of an ‘end’ (both 
completion and goal) as ahistorical and hence illusory and unstable; true historicity or finitude 
is better conceived as deferral and suspense. See Derrida, Jacques. 1995. Gift of Death. 
Translated by David Wills. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
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singular, i.e. unique, attempt at such a construction. At most it would point to a 
parallel discovery – one that was made over 80 years ago but never saw the day 
and one that does appear and receives attention in its own time.3 These 
prognostications may appear to be hopeful wishes of a would-be attempt to 
imagine an independent version of the missing Division III given the waning 
moments, which conclude the version of Being and Time that we have had in our 
possession over the last eighty years. However, making clear our intention and 
goal will help clarify our main thesis: the creation of the missing Division III from 
scratch is not dependent on some a prior understanding of the relation or 
discontinuity between Being and Time and “On Time and Being.” The question 
then is what is the ground by which our quest to construct the missing Division 
III can become intelligible? Using Heideggerean language, we can say ours is the 
question of the meaning of the being of the missing Division III. 
It is always hard to justify one’s philosophical project in one’s age 
precisely when the very question of ‘age’ and hence ‘time itself’ is at stake. One is 
reminded of powerful projections from Hegel such as “it is in the nature of truth 
to appear in its own time” (Hegel 1977, 44) and “philosophy is its own age 
conceptualized in thought.” (Hegel 1991, 21) However, these statements have 
been construed either as an attempt to transcend one’s time and hence let truth 
appear in its own time independent of human design or the failure at such 
transcendence and the relegation of truth to a particular age even when such a 
truth passes itself off as a detached universal; the first Hegel quote points to the 
former and the second to the latter. Yet we are not discussing how one 
transcends time to offer an eternal truth; nor are we succumbing to the notion 
that any truth or revelation is no more than the sum parts of the particular age 
within which it appears. Coming back to the question of the missing Division III 
we point to an opportunity that runs counter to many contemporary 
assumptions: a) the attempt to speak on behalf of a conclusion to Being and Time 
that could have appeared in its time is impossible now because the past in which 
the conclusion could have appeared is more appropriate then than it is today; b) 
no one actually believed then nor do they believe today that the way in which 
Being and Time was set up renders it possible to answer the last question about 
the manifestation of time if in fact manifestation is linked to an event, logos or 
phenomenon attached to presence and presence is derived from a ‘now’ – be it 
no longer now (past), now (present) or yet to be now (future); c) the correlation 
between the question of the meaning of being and the would-be answer as ‘time’ 
mistakes the one who asks the question ex nihilo with a tortured, delimited 
                                                        
3 This happens in science quite often; some discoveries are independent and parallel, say the 
simultaneous discovery of calculus by Newton and Leibniz, and the close proximity of 
Poincare’s “principle of relative motion” (1904) and Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity 
(1905). However, in history, usually one thinker is credited for changing the paradigm and 
shaping the next epoch in human thought. In the cases provided here that would fall on the 
shoulders of Newton and Einstein respectively. 
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temporalized being seeking self-reflexively the timing of one’s asking; or that 
time is exteriorized falsely from that being requiring a separation between the 
meaning of being (as if it were atemporal) and the answer called the 
manifestation of time as if it were something other or opposite to eternal being; 
d) the futility of converting time into a predicate is directly proportionate to 
imagining the meaning of being as something other than being and hence being 
as past, present or future. 
It would appear that the prefatory remarks we offer are unceasing; in fact 
the temptation to continue must be resisted. In that light, let us juxtapose first 
section 65 in Being and Time with “On Time and Being” as we begin to weave the 
strands together as a silhouette of the missing Division III begins to form. The 
contours of a shape begin to emerge not with a comparison and contrast of what 
is left wanting in Being and Time and reborn in “On Time and Being.” Rather, the 
attempt at a synthesis has to negate the continuities and discontinuities of both 
texts as an inter-species dialogue while superseding the presences and absences 
within both texts as an intra-species sublation. This way we avoid repeating any 
presuppositions that would lead to conclusions about “On Time and Being” filling 
up Being and Time or Being and Time being re-read to make clear the chronic 
ambiguities and spectral elisions, which abound in “On Time and Being.” We 
must stick to our conviction about the original construction of the missing 
Division III in a manner, voice, force and inspiration that cannot be derived from 
either Being and Time or “On Time and Being.” 
Being and Time 
In section 65, Heidegger reluctantly tries to move forward to the problematic of 
temporality to which everything prior seemed to be leading.4 But for every step 
he takes, he reverts back to try and ensure himself and the reader that he is not 
over-glossing or inadvertently simplifying his previous insights into care, 
resoluteness and being-towards death. He wants to make sure that the 
ontological meaning of Dasein’s being, the latter of which is care, is not reduced 
to something present because the previous themes (care, resoluteness, etc.) are 
never ontic or grasped in common sense, transparent, experiential ways. To 
grasp it ‘phenomenally’ means it is never an object of a subject, a subject as an 
object to itself, any relation between a subject and object whatsoever, and 
certainly nothing that is present-to-hand. (Heidegger 1962, 370) Dasein’s Being 
is Care and the meaning of its being will turn out to be temporality, which is to be 
                                                        
4 Although, he does give an idea of it in the Introduction: “We shall point to temporality as the 
meaning of Being of that entity which we call Dasein.” Heidegger (1962, 38) And “time needs 
to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of Being, and in terms of 
temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being.” Heidegger (1962, 39) Finally, 
“the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time…” Heidegger (1962, 
40) and “Thus the fundamental ontological task of Interpreting Being as such includes 
working out the Temporality of Being.” Heidegger (1962, 40) 
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discussed in depth in section 65. But the ‘totality of the Dasein’s structural 
whole’ should not be lost in a mindless dissection of how all the themes hang 
together – guilt, anxiety, care, resoluteness, and being-towards-death – in a 
dramatically creative but aimless way. It is not simply tossing the dice randomly 
and seeing which sides turn up on the table. To answer the meaning of care (as 
the being of Dasein) does not mean that anything will actually appear as 
something that is “explicit or thematic.” (Heidegger 1962, 371) At rock bottom, 
the meaning of Dasein’s being is at stake: this is temporality. All we have at this 
juncture is a becoming of Dasein in its essentiality, a becoming of Dasein to itself, 
an occurrence which happens as ‘authentic existence,’ the self-constitution of this 
occurrence as authentically ‘existentiale’ (not to be confused with existentialist 
or psychological absurdity about the futility of living or being suicidal) and the 
naming of this occurrence of authenticity as ‘anticipatory resoluteness.’ 
Furthermore, the ‘resoluteness’ is a mode of the ‘authenticity of care’ and in that 
mode is contained Dasein’s ‘primordial Self-constancy and totality.’5 If we were 
to line up the terms, then the linkage between them becomes the main issue for 
discernment: 
Dasein becomes X essentially. 
This is an occurrence as an authentic existentiality. 
The occurrence can constitute itself as anticipatory resoluteness.6 
                                                        
5 Full quotation from Heidegger in the English translation: “Dasein becomes ‘essentially’ 
Dasein in that authentic existence which constitutes itself as anticipatory resoluteness. Such 
resoluteness, as a mode of authenticity of care, contains Dasein’s primordial Self-constancy 
and totality.” (Heidegger 1962, 370) and the original German: “Das Dasein wird ‘wesentlich’ in 
der eigentlilchen Existenz, die sich als vorlaufende Entschlossenheit konstituert. Dieser Modus 
der Eigenlichkeit der Sorge enthält die ursprüngliche Selbst-ständigkeit und Ganzheit des 
Daseins.” (Heidegger 1993, 323) 
6 This will be discussed further down the line when we discuss the ecstasies of having-been, 
making present, futural-coming-towards. Needless to say, we can anticipate what ‘anticipatory 
resoluteness’ is not based on Heidegger’s previous insights in Division I and the chapters of 
Division II leading up to section 65. Anticipation is not the anticipation of something: for 
example, I am waiting to find out how I did on my exam. Resoluteness is not the unstoppable 
motion of a killing machine – be it man made or from nature – like a great white shark. It is not 
a setting out to do that which cannot be reversed. It is also not because of the law of internal 
necessity either (i.e. inertia – a body in motion tends to stay in motion). Rather, we must 
ponder the uncanny: somehow an event of self-justification occurs in which an irreducible 
decision to act becomes ontologically meaningful based on an inscrutable sense of ecstatic 
freedom; one is free not to be stymied by indecision on so many other possibilities for paths to 
take and free to take the path one has thrown themselves into without being determined by 
that path. Anticipating the unknown and resolutely driving into that anticipation without 
waiting for any ‘thing’ in particular (i.e. getting older, a moment to die, being elected president, 
giving birth to a child) involves a very abstract type of phenomenological bracketing; while 
being resolved in such an anticipation in a manner that transcends fate/destiny/determinism 
and the free-will divide, one is suspended from any ordinary linkages that would normally 
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Resoluteness is a mode. 
The mode is a way of occurring and in this case it is the way of how care is 
authentic. 
Contained in the mode is Dasein’s primordial self-constancy and totality. 
By breaking up the Heideggerean proposition into these elements we can 
begin to see the kind of complex, uncanny occurrence that speaks to the deepest 
primordial totality of Dasein’s whole being, which is the authenticity of care; and 
this is what gets simplified in many analyses.7 The meaning of Dasein’s being 
(care) will turn out to be temporality – specifically, the ecstatic, finite, primordial, 
unified, temporalizing of time’s ecstasies (having-been, making present, futural 
coming towards).8 Before we penetrate further into the very Being of Dasein as 
Time-Occurrence (Timing, Timeliness, Being One’s Time) let us shift to “On Time 
and Being.” Heidegger does admit of the following: Dasein becoming Dasein 
essentially, authentic existence self-constituted as anticipatory resoluteness, 
mode of authenticity of care, primordial Self-constancy and totality contained in 
the mode – all of these have to be understood ‘existentially’ in order to reveal 
“the ontological meaning of Dasein’s being.” (Heidegger 1962, 370) It is these 
features that have to be retread very carefully while appropriating elements in 
“On Time and Being.” And then we can weave in new reflections on the actual 
ecstasies in section 65 to depart from Being and Time and begin an exploration of 
unknown territory – the actual creation of what would have and could have been 
the missing Division III. 
                                                                                                                                           
bind the discrete event of existence and the palpable experience of time (as an unstoppable 
flow, a dreadful limit, an irreversible loss, or any feeling of getting old and/or losing time on a 
project). In other words, one is not determined by resoluteness or free to anticipate; and 
likewise, anticipation is not the necessity of a future holding a helpless present hostage, and 
resolution is not a despotic present trying to over-determine the untamed future. The relation 
between the anticipation in resoluteness and the resoluteness in anticipation constitutes a 
nexus in which the well-spring or surge of being ‘anticipatory resolute’ comes from within and 
without rather than the so-called ‘agent’ experiencing either one. It is an ecstatic swarming 
effect that drives a transcendental form of propulsion (which is neither circular, linear, nor 
rectilinear) so one is thrown outside of themselves in chasing a singularity called the legacy of 
being-there without being past, present or future. 
7 This is not to dismiss any particular analysis of time in Division II, but to suggest that any 
speculative metaphysical constructions of the ‘occurrence’ is deemed inadmissible given the 
ontological-ontic distinction that is so fundamental to how the entire ‘existential analytic’ of 
Dasein functions in Being and Time. Heidegger is destroying the history of metaphysical 
attempts to conceive of time as some ‘thing’ or concept and thereby undoing all previous 
attempts to think of being as being-in-time or time as an object of either the metaphysical or 
scientific imagination. See the entire Introduction to Being and Time. And yet time is the 
meaning of the Being of Dasein. Logically however it follows that if time means being (of 
Dasein’s being as care), then what does time mean? 
8 This is what section 65 tries to elaborate. 
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“On Time and Being” 
The 1962 lecture is like an aquatic work. One can swim through it but feel like 
they were in these waters before sensing resemblances based on past 
experiences of the force of the tow, the composition of the ocean bedrock and the 
animal and plant species that inhabit it in its marvelous aesthetic display. The 
lecture comes off as quasi-autobiographical where the author reflects back and 
takes stock of his achievements and failures, particularly in Being and Time. He 
leaves open room for future thinkers to try to resume the project of Being and 
Time but in a fresh and new way.9 In the summary to the lecture, Stambaugh 
states: “Being and Time is on the way toward finding a concept of time, to which 
that which belongs most of all to time, in terms of which ‘Being’ gives itself as 
presencing. This is accomplished on the path of the temporality of Dasein in the 
interpretation of Being as temporality” and “after the meaning of Being had been 
clarified, the whole analytic of Dasein was to be more originally repeated in a 
completely different way.” (Heidegger 1972, 32)10 That is the key: to ‘originally 
repeat’ the whole analytic of Dasein in ‘in a completely different way.’  
Our hypothesis is simple: the original repetition of Being and Time 
involves a type of movement and its self-understanding in which a reciprocal, 
entwining appropriation of insights in Being and Time and “On Time and Being” 
is required to create the missing Division III, which is then irreducible to either 
Being and Time or “On Time and Being,” let alone their relation or 
discontinuity.11 The question of movement relates to the question of genesis, and 
                                                        
9 Heidegger says: “Whether a few will, now or later, be prompted by the lecture to think 
further on such matters, cannot be foreseen.” This is in reference to other great novelties put 
forward by geniuses in different fields – that if the painter Klee, the poet Trakl, and the 
physicist Heisenberg were to present something new, then few would be able to say that it is 
‘immediately intelligible.’ (Heidegger 1972, 2) 
10 Also see her Introduction to the volume. Stambaugh does not accomplish this repetition in 
an original way in which something is revealed in a completely different manner. If anything, 
she pronounces the judgment that “On Time and Being” is a ‘reversal’ of the entire project in 
Being and Time. But in fairness to her, she does not speak of a simple reversal but a ‘road that 
is complex and subtle’ leading from Heidegger’s early masterpiece to his mysterious later 
lecture: “For in the later lectures these ‘concepts’ (i.e. Being and time) have undergone a 
profound change without, however, relinquishing their initial fundamental intention.” 
(Heidegger 1072, vii) Again, it is not our task to engage in intellectual history or enter into the 
philosophical debates about the relation or discontinuity between the two works. We want to 
stay focused on the original task of creating the missing Division III without ever having 
witnessed it. Hence we speak of a construction and neither a deconstruction or reconstruction. 
Simply put, this means we have to introduce new distinctions and terms while grounding 
them in our own mode of systematic philosophical reasoning the likes of which are nowhere 
found in any of Heidegger’s published writings. Ultimately we must be sensitive and attuned to 
the debates about Being and Time and “On Time and Being” without necessarily submerging 
into them. 
11 This is why we feel justified in our endeavor and do not feel the need to traverse the 
enormously complicated debates on the ‘failure of Being and Time’ and the Kehre (turn) and 
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the event of revelation in response to both questions is none other than ‘time 
itself.’12 This, however, means we cannot ignore all the cautionary measures that 
Heidegger offers in his lecture about those who try to think the relation of Being 
and time in ways other than the tradition of Western metaphysics – Being as 
beings which presence and time as the spatialized becoming of nows. 
Traditionally, Being has always been thought of by the presence of time, time has 
determined Being in some way, and because of Being, time is thought to ‘to be’ 
spatial or geometric – linear or circular for example. But when one takes the 
plunge into the radical rethinking of the relation between Being and time in 
terms other than the history of Western metaphysics all kinds of obscurities can 
arise. He asks: “Why, in what manner and from what source does something like 
time have a voice of Being? Every attempt to think adequately the relation of 
Being and time with the help of the current and imprecise representations of 
time and Being immediately becomes ensnared in a hopeless tangle of relations 
that have hardly been thought out.” (Heidegger 1972, 2) Indeed the relation is 
what has ‘hardly been thought out.’  
We try to put time into Being and conceive it as some type of substance 
that only we humans for some reason tend to feel anxious about; we think we 
see everything around us perishing including our individual selves (the physical 
feeling of getting older and the body wearing out), or the cyclical nature of 
disasters, or the dramatic changes in political history, which cannot be 
anticipated (9/11 and the 2011 Arab Spring), or a technological breakthrough 
(the Internet). We think time is something in us (we intuit it or feel it but cannot 
name it) or something outside of us (we perceive it or sense it) – like a river 
flowing of which we are its hapless eddies swirling through it without being able 
to control our own movements within its movement, let alone the movement 
englobing all movements, which we think is time. We are slaves to time in terms 
of the tenses that structure our linguistic contexts. Time haunts us in our dreams 
by invoking past experiences and blending them in a creative act that 
foreshadows future events. Often, we feel the dread of past actions, explicit or 
implicit guilt not about any particular event or act or decision, but the collective 
malaise of a period of life spent, which did not meet certain expectations for 
achievement. Furthermore, metaphysics has compounded the matter by 
instantiating a distinction that logic fails to overcome – namely being as 
seemingly unchanging (a stone) and becoming as change (a person getting older 
                                                                                                                                           
what “On Time and Being” has to say about those matters. See footnote one, which lists the 
extraordinary commentaries and philosophical analyses by at least two generations of 
scholars in the Anglo-American world and continental Europe. Also see Stambaugh’s Summary 
of the Seminar. She argues how the lecture differs from everything else in the later Heidegger’s 
seminars (art, technology, the History of Being) in that Heidegger’s own thought is the subject 
of the seminar and not another text from the history of metaphysics (Nietzsche, Hegel or 
Aristotle for example). Parentheses are my insertions. See Heidegger (1972, 25). 
12 This points back to the last question of Being and Time about the very manifestation of time. 
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or the history of a presidential administration). Being – from the verb ‘to be’ – 
goes unquestioned; and on the basis of it our uncritical usage of the verb it is 
temporalized in an arbitrary way to speak of things that ‘were’, ‘are’ and ‘will be.’ 
Yet these precisely are all the ‘imprecise’ representations that for Heidegger 
have descended from the dawn of Western metaphysics. His novel question is to 
ask why did this history begin and to question its origin as something unnatural 
or contingent – that perhaps we could have been fashioned differently and that 
all historical concepts in philosophy about time and Being could have been 
otherwise.13 
Instead of thinking about a being in time, say a chronological date of an 
event or the age of a person (like one of your relatives), Heidegger invites us to 
think of the other aspect of time. We can test whether something closer to timing 
or propitiousness, like kairos, when the time is ripe for something, is more 
appropriate. He states: “We name time when we say: everything has its time. 
This means: everything which actually is, every being comes and goes at the 
right time and remains for a time during the time allotted to it. Everything has its 
time.” (Heidegger 1972, 3) Time is not a thing; nor is it the analogy or the 
metaphor for a spatialized flow; nor is it unchanging substance as a 
transcendental category (hence never an object of the empirical sense) for 
change or simultaneous and successive events to take place in it (Kant’s first 
analogy of experience). Time is not the movement of ticks on a clock, the rotation 
of the earth on its axis or its trip around the sun.14 Similarly, Being is not a being 
or a thing, which has its time. (Heidegger 1972, 3) And yet we must ask the 
question about the ‘is’ which is never to be found in any statement when we say 
something ‘is’ this or that. Being is not a thing and everything has its time, which 
leads to the next great but perplexing question – does Being have ‘its time’ in a 
manner that is ontologically distinct from things that have their time, i.e. time for 
a boy to start acting like a man? By this question we are not asking whether 
Being (which is not the ‘is’ of any copula) possesses time like a landowner who 
owns his property. Heidegger says time is named as something allotted or 
appointed. When someone’s time has come, they have come out in their own, 
                                                        
13 Similarly, one can ask as Nietzsche once did in his blistering Antichrist (1888) why truth of a 
particular religion took the form of a specific narrative of events regarding the life of a single 
human being that lived 2000 years ago, namely Jesus of Nazareth. Could the life of Jesus have 
been totally different and with a different outcome (not dying on the Cross or being 
resurrected from a sealed tomb) and still become one Person in the Trinitarian God of 
Christianity? If so, then how else could this truth have been presented in a totally different 
content and form? For dogmatic Christianity, this question is unnecessary, if not downright 
heretical. There is only one story and one outcome that forms the basis of the truth of 
Christianity and this truth is universal and necessary. If not, then there is not faith at all as 
Paul says. (1 Corinthians 15:13.) 
14 It is certainly not derived from the scientific theory of evolution or the astrophysical time, 
however mysterious and complex, say the paradoxes that flow from Einstein’s General Theory 
of Relativity. 
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revealing the essence of who they truly are.15 Time remains; it is allotted; things 
happen at the right time. It is in the nature of time to remain and occur rightly. 
This is not equivalent to an actual physical measurement of time like a certain 
hour or date, say New Year’s Eve.16 So how do we think about the relation 
between Being (the undisclosed ground that makes possible any ‘is’) and time, 
which remains and is allotted (but not like a physical event that exists) in terms 
of the question of Being and its (non-possessive) time? That is the question we 
must ask as we return back to the inner-anatomy of section 65 in Being and Time. 
Before we do that we must extract a few more insights from “On Time and 
Being”: 
“Being is not a thing, thus nothing temporal, and yet it is determined by time as 
presence.” 
“Time is not a thing, thus nothing which is, and yet it remains constant in its 
passing away without being something temporal like beings in time.” 
We have several distinctions here and commonalities between distinctions. 
For example, both Being and time are not things. Only things can be temporal – 
they perish or become or die and we can witness that process. Things that are 
temporal suffer internal mutation and transformation or can change both their 
content and form. Neither Being nor time falls in this category. But one caveat is 
that time is constant even though it passes away just as temporal things pass 
away within it (i.e. in one calendar year this many people died in this particular 
city thus affecting its census). So we have a distinction between a) time passing 
and remaining what it is and b) temporal beings in time that perish. Time as 
presence does not mean it is like any present thing to our senses or imagination. 
Presence is not present or ready to hand or a measurable moment.17 We also 
                                                        
15 One common sense notion of this is when an artist or musician is recognized at the peak of 
their achievement. They are in the moment and their time has arrived, one can say. 
16 One can argue that the only possible being, who can be compared to this issue of time 
allotment and one’s time has come, is the being alluded to in the statements by Jesus in the 
Gospels about his time. For example, we find “my time has not yet come” and “this is the hour 
for which I was sent” in the Gospel of John or the secret of time as in “Neither man, nor the 
angels nor the Son knows the hour – only the Father” in the Synoptic Gospels (Mark 13:32; 
Matthew 24:36; Luke 17:26). As a single substance of two natures (divine and human) the 
experience of time is by necessity totally transcendent given the Son’s co-eternal substance 
and relation with the Father and yet fully human in every sense of the word – being born, 
living and dying in historical time – with all the anxiety and perplexity surrounding any human 
being that knows they are going to die. To synthesize the transcendental consciousness of 
knowing one’s time and yet appearing in time while being before it and after it as an eternal 
commitment is something Hegel, for example, struggled with in the penultimate chapter and 
last chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit. But this is another matter altogether for theology 
and the philosophy of religion. 
17 Perhaps a word other than ‘presence’ (and hence absence) would be more useful to avoid all 
the connotations that surround the term: something that has presence is tied to the dramatic 
(‘stage presence’) or that you have a real sense of a charismatic personality with all its charm, 
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have Being and time as not things (temporal or otherwise), they share a relation, 
Being has its time allotted to it and time remains for it. These will be important 
considerations when we return to the main features we saw opened up in 
section 65 in Being and Time, namely the motion-occurrence-mode of 
authenticity, which contains Dasein’s ‘primordial self-constancy and totality, 
which in turn reveals the ontological meaning of Dasein’s whole Being. This of 
course is hypothesized to be time itself but not as a substance, concept, intuition, 
phenomenon or emotional feeling, however, intangible. Hence we are back to the 
reciprocal relation of Being and time. “On Time and Being” pursues these 
reflections as well. 
Heidegger makes several statements, which require speculative expansion. 
He says that “time is determined by some kind of Being” (whereby Being is not a 
thing and therefore neither is time). But then he asks how “is Being determined 
by time?” (Heidegger 1972, 3) And then comes the big push for Heidegger: 
“Being and time determine each other reciprocally, but in such a manner that 
neither can the former-Being-be addressed as something temporal nor can the 
latter-time-be addressed as a being.” (1972, 3)18 It is amazing that Heidegger 
readily admits the limitations of his thinking and the threat of contradictions and 
circular repetitions. But is there a way out? Someone like Hegel would speak 
about one self-consciousness (say the master) and another (say the slave) 
becoming the other and seeing itself as the other and vice-versa in a double 
movement of reciprocal determination. (Hegel 1977) Is something similar 
occurring with regard to Heidegger’s statements about Being and time? 
Admittedly, to construct another Division III would have to avoid the pitfalls of 
contradiction, redundancy and circularity that Heidegger admits to in “On Time 
and Being.”  
Let us analyze his statements further. Being and time determine each 
other ‘reciprocally’ but in a way where Being is not a temporal thing and time is 
not a being, and only beings-in-time and time itself as passing away can be 
perishable. But time also has the quality of remaining itself. We must inquire into 
this mode of mutual or reciprocal determination and phenomenologically reduce 
any notions of being temporal, being in time, time as passing way entropically in 
                                                                                                                                           
force and charisma; presence is tied to the supernatural or paranormal – something is present 
– you can sense it, feel it or apperceive it – without identifying it exactly in tangible, material 
terms; presence is something that surrounds and bounds a place or space so that some things 
are excluded from the purity its realm (the presence of a temple); presence is the secret 
organizing principle of a complex event or gathering (say a national convention), which is 
irreducible to any particular moment or series of moments and their relations that would 
otherwise comprise the duration of the whole event. 
18 The very next statement after that is: “As we give thought to all of this, we find ourselves 
adrift in contradictory statements.” 
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which everything tends in one direction.19 We must be extra-cautious about not 
presuming any immediate given sense of what it means to give and receive and 
give-back and all their underlying complex presuppositions. Geometric diagrams 
of the gift-flow will not help us. And to remind ourselves, Being is nothing 
temporal and time is never a being. Let us bracket the phenomenon of the 
reciprocal determination of Being and Time. And then we have the miraculous 
question of timing and if and whether Being has its own timing but unlike 
anything else that has its time – like something coming to an end or a person 
who dies or an artist who finally gets an audience. The question of timing, 
movement and the event of reciprocal determination will provide the clues for 
our re-immersion in section 65. We will be on the path of the original repetition 
to think Being and Time’s project in a ‘completely different way.’ Ultimately this 
should and will result in the creation of the missing Division III. 
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